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 ‘Competing Ideologies of Representation in Southeast Asia’ 
 
Garry Rodan 
 
Abstract: In both post-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia there 
are  continuing  struggles  over  the  forms  and  extent  of  political  representation. 
Importantly, many of the same ideologies are present across these different categories 
of regime. Ideas of, and constituencies for, non-democratic representation exist in 
democratic societies and vice versa. Alongside democratic notions of representation, 
populist,  localist  and  consensus  rationales  compete  for  support  in  the  dynamic 
political  economies  of  Southeast  Asia.  However,  in  contests  to  shape  political 
representation, historical factors including legacies of the Cold War and structural 
impacts of global capitalist development are not favourable to the pursuit of interests 
through  independent,  collective  action  –  especially  cohesive  social  movements 
involving  trade  unions  –  that  characterised  the  experiences  of  democratisation  in 
Western Europe. This profoundly influences the complexion and levels of support for 
different ideologies of representation in the region. 
 
The final version of this paper is published in Third World Quarterly, 33(2), pp. 311-
332. 
 
Introduction  
The  2011  ‘Arab  Spring’  invites  reflections  on  uprisings  against  authoritarian  rule 
starting a quarter of a century ago in Southeast Asia. Subsequent to the 1986 ‘People 
Power’  removal  of  Marcos  in  the  Philippines,  mass  protests  of  ‘Black  May’ 
precipitated  the  temporary  end  of  military  dictatorship  in  Thailand  in  1992  and 
‘reformasi’ halted over three decades of Suharto’s authoritarian rule in Indonesia. In 
all cases, significant new political space opened up, although not necessarily in ways 
consistent  with  procedural  or  substantive  democracy.
1  Meanwhile,  authoritarian 
regimes in Singapore and Malaysia have largely consolidated power,
2 while variously 
incorporating new avenues for political participation.
3 
What  sort  of  political  regimes  emerged  after  Southeast  Asia’s  protest 
movements and why didn’t comparable movements surface elsewhere in the region? 
Answers may offer insights into factors likely to determine whether new political 
regimes in the Middle East do more than replace one system of elite rule for another; 
whether  other  authoritarian  regimes  under  pressure  survive;  and  whether 
neoliberalism,  which  contributed  so  much  to  unemployment  and  other  concerns 
behind mass mobilisations,
4 is arrested or entrenched.  
Looking  to  Southeast  Asia,  though,  history  has  been  critical  in  shaping 
struggles  over  different  trajectories  of  political  regimes.  Attempts  to  build  new 2	
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democracies and to consolidate or refine authoritarian regimes have been conducted 
in a different setting from the democratisations of early industrialising countries in 
Western  Europe,  Britain  and  other  established  liberal  democracies.  The  lingering 
effects of Cold War suppression of civil society organisation, coupled with the advent 
of globalised capitalist production compounding the difficulties of independent labour 
organisation in particular, have profoundly affected the nature of social forces and the 
political coalitions and alliances forged between them.  Cohesive democratic social 
movements have been difficult to sustain in this context, notwithstanding periodic 
popular mobilisations in different parts of the region.  
Crucially, struggles in Southeast Asia over the nature of political regimes and 
attendant institutions – including through mass mobilisations – have given expression 
to a range of ideologies. Indeed, it is argued here that political fragmentation of social 
forces, linked to historically-specific geopolitics and capitalist dynamics, has been 
conducive  to  non-democratic  ideologies.  This  argument  is  advanced  below  with 
special focus on ideologies of political representation, which are fundamental define 
to any political regime. Select analyses of populist, localist and consensus ideologies 
of political representation within Southeast Asia are provided to show why People 
Power movements do not always lead to democratic forms of representation and how 
they have been avoided altogether in some cases.  
 
Political Regimes: Analytical Frameworks 
Among  the  most  influential  concepts  available  for  evaluating  political  regime 
directions is that of the ‘hybrid regime,’ combining elements of both democracy and 
authoritarianism. The innovative aspect of hybrid regime literature is recognising that 
these  regimes  can  be  distinct  and  stable,  not  necessarily  en  route  to  fuller 
democratisation or outright authoritarianism.
5 However, analytical use of this concept 
has often tended to constrain our understanding of regime dynamics and possibilities. 
In  particular,  detailed  descriptions  and  typologies  of  hybrid  regimes  have 
proliferated,  with  emphasis  on  evaluating  the  functional  quality  of  political 
institutions  against  democratic  criteria.
6  Hybrid  regimes  have  thus  variously  been 
characterised  as  ‘defective,’  ‘pseudo’  and  ‘partial’  democracies.
7  This  betrays  a 
persistent and problematic transition theory assumption that liberal democracy is the 
natural  partner  to  modern  economies  and  societies,  despite  Carothers’  declaration 
nearly  a  decade  ago  that  the  transition  paradigm  has  ended.
8  The  result  is  more 3	
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description of what a regime is not and prescription about what it ought to be, and less 
description and explanation of what it is and why. More open investigation into the 
nature  of  political  change  and  greater  attention  to  its  causes  is  required  if 
developments in Southeast Asia following earlier bursts of People Power are to be 
understood, let alone rendered instructive for Arab Spring analyses. 
Therefore,  the  approach  here  moves  beyond  consideration  of  how  closely 
institutions mirror or depart from ideal regime types. Why regimes take the form they 
do is the fundamental issue. To be sure, contributions on this have been made by 
theorists  seeking  to  explain  how  hybrid  regimes  are  socially  embedded,  with 
historical and structural contexts of political institutions incorporated into analysis.
9 
However,  the  approach  here  differs  in  emphasising  the  importance  of  historically 
specific capitalist development for dynamic social conflicts and political coalitions – 
especially class coalitions – seeking to shape the political institutions mediating these 
conflicts.  It  is  also  distinguished  by  the  importance  attached  to  identifying  and 
explaining the ideological basis of these coalitions, an under-explored dimension in 
the hybrid regime and broader democratisation literature.  
At the heart of conflict in Southeast Asia over regime forms lie questions 
about political representation: who should participate in politics and how? Competing 
ideological  positions  are  at  stake  here,  reflecting  different  preferred  social  and 
political orders. In particular, the answers affect the nature and extent of the political 
space  of  civil  society  and  the  state,  as  well  as  their  interrelationship.  They  also 
determine whether certain policy issues and debates, such as on structural inequalities 
inherent to capitalism, are incorporated into, or filtered out of, politics. Therefore, 
differences over representation have often separated social forces in Southeast Asia 
that were united in opposition to authoritarian rule. They have also been exploited by 
elites in remaining authoritarian regimes seeking to avert their own demise.  
To be sure, the extent and nature of civil society has ebbed and flowed over 
the  last  century  in  Southeast  Asia,  including  class-based  organisations  linked  to 
nationalist, socialist and communist movements.
10 This does not compare, though, 
with the deep historical roots of the political left crucial to earlier Western European 
democratisation.  Here  the  agency  of  independent  labour  organisations  was 
indispensible  to  universal  suffrage  and  expanded  political  pluralism.
11  There  was 
nothing natural about this role; it was the product of specific historical conditions. 
The  European  experience  is  not  a  yardstick  of  ‘normal’  political  development. 4	
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Moreover, struggles in Southeast Asia over political representation in the last half 
century have been conducted in the context of legacies from Cold War suppression of 
independent civil societies and rapidly mounting economic globalisation,
12 a context 
decidedly unfavourable to the political Left. 
While this hasn’t played out identically throughout the region, a uniform lack 
of mediating structures linking civil society groups and formal political institutions is 
striking  –  especially  in  the  case  of  independent  organised  labour.  Export-oriented 
industrialisation and relatively large white collar and informal sectors have laid quite 
different  social  foundations  for  political  development  than  those  in  liberal 
democracies  established  or  consolidated  under  import-substitution  and  Keynesian 
economic policies.
 13  
The consequence has been political fragmentation of social forces, regardless 
of  the  differing  scales  of  civil  societies  within  and  across  post-authoritarian  and 
authoritarian  societies  in  Southeast  Asia.  Non-governmental-organisations  (NGOs) 
have proliferated, encompassing a wide range of service, monitoring and advocacy 
roles, often working closely with authorities. Most of these are single-issue oriented 
but some have broader horizons, including claims to representing the underprivileged. 
However, cohesive collective political action has only periodically surfaced – albeit in 
dramatic  expressions  of  People  Power  social  movements.  Meanwhile,  sustained 
alliances between working and middle classes in pursuit of social democratic agendas 
of redistribution and social justice, or indeed more radical visions, linked to political 
parties  and  other  independent  civil  society  organisations  have  been  conspicuously 
absent.  
Moreover, middle class political demands have increasingly tended to focus 
around notions of ‘good governance.’ These resonate with neoliberal reform agendas 
but  not  necessarily  democratisation.  Middle  class  campaigns  are  most  concerted 
against  corruption  and  other  abuses  of  state  power,  while  neglecting  structural 
reforms to address social inequality. This emphasis has not just availed NGOs of 
funds from international aid agencies and international business, but resulted at times 
in middle class alliances with reactionary forces to jettison democratically elected 
governments  in  the  Philippines  and  Thailand.  In  the  absence  of  cohesive  civil 
societies connecting class-based interests to political institutions, the urban and rural 
poor have often looked to various alternatives as fillips to democratic representation, 
including forms of populism.  5	
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Towards  identifying  and  explaining  competing  ideologies,  institutions  and 
support  bases  of  representation  in  Southeast  Asia,  the  conceptual  approach  here 
distinguishes  between  democratic,  consensus,  populist  and  localist  representation. 
These  are  not  always  mutually  exclusive  categories  but  sufficiently  different  in 
emphasis to highlight major contrasting rationales for, and ways of institutionalising, 
representation. Before proceeding, the concept of ideology warrants clarification. The 
starting point for understanding ideology here is: ‘Any systematic set of practical or 
theoretical ideas which articulate the interests of a group.’
14 As Gramsci observed, 
ideological positions are not simply determined by social class. Hence civil society 
becomes a sphere of fierce competition of ideas, the outcome of which is fundamental 
to  political  rule.  However,  this  doesn’t  mean  social  structure  is  neutral  for  the 
prospects of different ideologies; it lays the basis and sets the limits for prospective 
alliances  and  conflicts  between  groups  over  the  appropriate  design  of  a  regime’s 
political institutions.  
Democratic  ideologies  of  representation  emphasize  that  actors  elected  or 
appointed to represent people, sectors, ideas or interests should be either directly or 
indirectly accountable to fellow citizens. Representation is a means by which political 
conflict and competition is conducted, with intermediary groups from civil society 
such as political parties, interest groups and independent trade unions intrinsic to this 
process. Democratic representation is open to new forms of collective association 
outside the electoral arena, but it requires authorisation and accountability by those 
being represented.
15 
By contrast, consensus ideologies emphasize the problem-solving utility of 
incorporating stakeholders, interests and/or expertise into public policy processes for 
the effective functioning of economic, social or political governance. Processes of 
consultation or deliberation lay the basis of claims to representing the public interest 
and are privileged over political contestation in parliamentary institutions. Populist 
ideologies  of  representation  emphasize  direct  links  between  ‘the  people’  and  the 
political  elite  and  make  claims  to  direct  democracy  on  this  basis.  Accordingly, 
populism  seeks  to  bypass  or  remove  intermediary  bodies  linking  citizens  and 
government,  placing  it  in  tension  with  political  pluralism.  Localist  ideologies  of 
representation emphasize the political rights of discrete communities and identities 
based on geography, ethnicity, race, culture or religion.  6	
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  The  following  is  not  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  struggles  over  political 
representation within different countries of Southeast Asia, nor indeed any one of the 
region’s  countries.  Instead,  the  discussion  selectively  examines  ideologies  and 
institutions  of  representation  in  Southeast  Asia  to  illustrate  how  and  why  non-
democratic  representation  can  be  facilitated  by  reinforcement  of  the  historically 
rooted fragmentation of social and political forces in the region. Political institutions 
are sites of struggle that reflect, and affect, the wider distribution of power in society 
and there is no inevitability about the outcome of this struggle. However, structural 
and  historical  factors  have  certainly  increased  the  odds  against  broad  coalitions 
embracing and seeking to institutionalize democratic representation.  
 
Filling the Vacuum with Populism  
In Thailand, collective political organisations to advance the interests of the socially 
and economically marginalised remain fragmented. The consequent gap in effective 
democratic  representation  of  these  social  forces  has  at  times  been  filled  by  non-
democratic  alternatives.  Populism  in  particular  has  proved  attractive  for  the  poor 
desperately seeking redress from the unequal impacts of contemporary capitalism, 
especially  in  times  of  economic  crisis.  The  Thai  experiences  also  highlight  how 
middle  class  concerns  about  good  governance  can  trump  support  for  democratic 
representation when class interests are at stake, leading even progressive elements of 
this class into temporary alliances with the most conservative forces.  
It  was  against  the  backdrop  of  the  1997-98  Asian  economic  crisis,  and 
espousing pro-poor measures, that business tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai 
Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) party secured Thailand’s biggest ever election victory in 
2001. Thaksin was re-elected in a landslide in 2005, by which time his rhetoric about 
the  need  for  redistribution  had  translated  into  policies  benefiting  sections  of  the 
poor,
16 especially small-scale farmers but also petty traders and the urban poor.
17 Yet 
he  and  the  TRT  would  ultimately  be  removed  through  military  and  constitutional 
coups  supported  by  many  NGOs  and  other  civil  society  forces.  In  the  process, 
competing  versions  of  People  Power  and  contrasting  ideologies  of  representation 
were expressed in opposition to, and support of, Thaksin and the TRT. The roots of 
this conflict were laid during the Cold War and reinforced by the nature of capitalist 
development thereafter. 7	
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Under authoritarian rule in Thailand, trade unions were the target of a variety 
of strategies by the military to undermine their organisational capacities and impair 
prospects  for  any  future  political  role.  Meanwhile,  a  loose  network  of  NGOs  did 
surface in the early 1980s adopting a focus on local development problems. These 
developmental NGOs, often supported by international aid agencies, grew from about 
40 in the early 1980s to in excess of 300 by the late 1990s. Eschewing strategies of 
mass  mobilisation  and  class  struggle,  they  generally  limited  their  ambitions  to 
tempering  capitalist  development  by  emphasising  sustainable  development  and 
participatory  democracy.
18  Nevertheless,  united  in  their  desire  to  see  an  end  to 
authoritarian rule, working class activists joined with the middle class in the daily 
demonstrations that peaked at 250,000 in May 1992, leading eventually to withdrawal 
of the King’s support of the regime.
19  
Thereafter,  though,  it  was  NGOs  rather  than  dedicated  independent  labour 
organisations that prospered under parliamentary politics. Thus, as Brown observes, 
‘working  class  organizations  remain  weak,  fragmented  and  politically  isolated.’
20 
Structural  factors  haven’t  helped.  By  2004,  the  industrial  workforce  still  only 
accounted  for  eight  per  cent  of  the  labour  force,  compared  with  41  per  cent  for 
agrarian, 26 per cent informal and 15 per cent white-collar workers.
21 For middle 
class developmental NGO activists, though, this structure has presented opportunities 
to take up causes on behalf of the rural poor in particular. By the late 1990s, NGO 
coalitions  had  become  significant  political  actors.  The  Assembly  of  the  Poor,  for 
example,  was  able  to  block  major  government  development  projects  displacing 
villagers or denying them access to vital resources.
22  
Struggles over political representation under Thaksin can be traced to the 1997 
Thai  Constitution.  Often  referred  to  as  the  ‘People’s  Constitution,’  it  engendered 
considerable democratic optimism for its explicit recognition of the rights to political 
participation  and  the  range  of  vertical  and  horizontal  accountability  institutions  it 
incorporated.  The  Constitution  was  also  designed  to  create  a  strong  and  stable 
executive  government  between  elections.  Yet  it  was  the  outcome  of  a  political 
compromise  between  conservative  elites,  or  what  McCargo  labels  ‘network 
monarchy,’
  23 and more liberal middle class social forces. As Hewison points out, 
royalist technocrats and liberal elite proponents of constitutional change argued that 
while participation must be permitted, it needs to be ‘carefully managed to prevent its 
radicalization.’
24  This  can  be  seen  in  the  requirement  that  only  candidates  with 8	
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university degrees were eligible to contest for parliament; effectively barring the mass 
of workers and farmers from representing their own class in parliament.  
Thaksin  and  TRT  captured  government  campaigning  against  the  austerity 
measures of the previous Chuan Leekpai government. TRT’s policies closely aligned 
to the interests of newly emerging elements of the domestic bourgeoisie hit hard by 
the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis and associated IMF reform programmes.
25 They 
also  reached  out  to  the  traditionally  neglected  rural  and  urban  poor  through  debt 
relief, village funds and other redistributive policies – as was necessary for electoral 
success under the 1997 Constitution. Collectively, TRT’s policies constituted a new 
social contract meant to improve the lot of the poor alongside the development of the 
domestic bourgeoisie.
26 In effect, a moderate dose of Keynesian economics was to 
provide the electoral basis for the consolidation and restructuring of Thai capitalism.  
However,  the  1997  Constitution  was  so  effective  in  facilitating  greater 
political party – and especially government executive – strength that Thaksin and the 
TRT had the capacity through the state to challenge vested elite interests. Systems of 
patronage integral to the network monarchy and given effect through such institutions 
as the military and the Privy Council could be bypassed or subordinated. Thaksin 
used appointments to the military and substituted police forces for military personnel 
in some operations in Southern Thailand, for example, to try and shift the balance of 
power within the state.
27 Vast business interests of the Crown Property Bureau – the 
entity that controlled the economic assets of the monarchy – were also among those 
threatened.
28  
Moreover, as the scale and breadth of the TRT’s popular redistributive policies 
increased,  so  too  did  the  strength  of  the  reaction  from  established  elites.  In  this 
context,  ‘Thaksin  went  from  modernist  reformer  championing  businessmen  in  the 
face of economic crises, to populist championing the poor against an old elite.’
29 TRT 
Ministers  thus  faded  from  public  view  as  Thaksin  dominated  all  public 
pronouncements, peppered with escalating references to, and identification with, ‘the 
people.’ Face-to-face meetings with the poor also replaced engagement with NGOs 
and civil society organisations advocating on their behalf, including the Assembly of 
the  Poor  and  state  enterprise  labour  leaders  whose  advice  and  proposals  he  had 
rejected.
30  
Thaksin pronounced in late 2003 that ‘I check the feeling of the people all the 
time.’
31 Significant elements of the middle class were thus also being bypassed as 9	
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Thaksin  usurped  their  self-appointed  roles  as  defenders  of  the  poor.  Thaksin’s 
authoritarian  tendencies  also  became  more  manifest  as  opponents  and  critics 
challenged his exercise of state power, which he rationalised with populist rhetoric. 
Thaksin asserted, for example, that ‘working for the people’ had priority over the 
operations  of  parliament,  human  rights  and  the  checks  and  balances  introduced 
through the 1997 Constitution. Parliamentary opposition involving adversarial politics 
was denounced because it ‘may be a betrayal of our social contract to the people.’
32 
Shortly  after  Thaksin’s  and  TRT’s  2005  re-election,  corruption  allegations 
surfaced, leading to anti-government demonstrations by a complex of urban social 
forces that were tacitly backed by the network monarchy. Sondhi Limthongkul, a 
media  mogul  and  former  backer  of  Thaksin,  was  a  key  leader  of  this  People’s 
Alliance for Democracy (PAD), or ‘Yellow Shirts,’ but some 40 NGOs and civil 
society  organisations  were  also  involved.
33  The  grievances  ranged  beyond  the 
governance  questions  and  expressions  of  support  for  the  monarchy  so  central  to 
conservatives  to  concerns  about  Free  Trade  Agreements,  privatisation  and 
authoritarianism.
34 Thaksin responded by calling yet another election for April 2006, 
boycotted  by  major  opposition  parties.  The  TRT  landslide  election  result  was 
subsequently  annulled  by  the  Constitutional  Court,  which  ordered  new  polls. 
However,  before  new  elections  took  place,  a  military  coup  in  September  2006 
removed Thaksin and the TRT.
35  
Subsequently,  growing  opposition  to  the  coup  and  the  military  tutelage  of 
politics  saw  anti-coup  and  pro-Thaksin  groups  come  together  to  form  the  United 
Front  of  Democracy  Against  Dictatorship  (UDD),  or  ‘Red  Shirts,’  supported  by 
workers and small farmers. In the complex ensuing, and ultimately violent, struggle 
between  the  Red  and  Yellow  Shirts,  the  Red-Shirt  aligned  People’s  Power  Party 
(PPP),  TRT’s  successor,  would  have  its  election  victory  nullified  after  the 
Constitutional Court dissolved the PPP in December 2008. Thereafter, class conflict 
became  even  more  manifest.  Some  NGO  and  civil  society  leaders  labelled  UDD 
mobilisations around issues of inequality, injustice and class struggle as left wing or 
even communist.
36 Their preference was for a politics focused on local-level issues 
such as corruption and related governance matters.
37 Significantly, the organisational 
implications of this position lead not in the direction of broad-based collective action 
to represent the poor. 10	
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Conservative  and  middle  class  elitism  were  crucial  factors  in  the  Yellow 
versus  Red  Shirt  polarisation  over  political  representation.  Sondhi,  for  example, 
asserted  that  ‘most  people  outside  the  middle  class  lack  sufficient  knowledge  to 
understand how power can be used.’
38 Political scientist and Yellow Shirt supporter, 
Anek Laothamatas, also contended that rural voters had simply become clients of a 
national  boss  in  place  of  a  local  one,  reproducing  traditional  patron-client 
relationships and mentality.
39 Additionally, though, Thai elitism draws on a romantic 
communitarian ideology of localism (thongthinniyom). This emphasizes the virtues of 
rural subsistence for villagers and the need to ensure the moral capacities of local 
communities  to  cope  with  the  challenges  of  a  global  market  economy.
40  Public 
intellectual Prawet Wasi’s pronouncements on this have been especially influential on 
developmental NGOs, much of whose work is predicated on the subsistence producer 
ideal and is endorsed or supported by royalist organisations.
41 According to Prawet, 
because ‘the people still cannot think more of the public interest than themselves and 
their cronies,’
42 local communities need nurturing by the middle class whose educated 
lifestyle requires rational calculation. 
Through  the  2007  Constitution,  drafted  predominantly  by  traditional 
monarchy-linked bureaucratic and military elites, the previous aims of strengthening 
political  parties  and  executive  powers  were  reversed  in  favour  of  reinforcing 
horizontal  accountability  mechanisms  –  especially  through  greater  judicial  powers 
over politics.
43 As a further safeguard against democratic representation exerting too 
much  influence,  a  committee  comprised  exclusively  of  judges  and  heads  of 
independent agencies now appoints 74 of the 150 Senate seats; and all senators are 
required to hold a university degree.
44  
Subsequently,  when  elections  were  held  under  the  new  constitution  in 
December  2007,  the  pro-Thaksin  People’s  Power  Party  (PPP)  won  government. 
However, in December 2008 the constitutional court dissolved the PPP and, after 
some parliamentary manoeuvring, the pro-royalist technocratic Abhisit Vejjajiva of 
the Democratic Party was installed as Prime Minister without a general election. Red 
Shirt  mobilisation  against  the  government  led  to  occupation  of  areas  of  central 
Bangkok and a brutal military crackdown authorised by the Abhisit government. In 
the ensuing violence between March and May 2010, 92 people were killed and nearly 
2,000 injured.
45 However, Abhisit’s attempt to settle the contention through a general 11	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
election in July 2011 saw the Red Shirt-backed Pheu Thai Party, led by Thaksin’s 
sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, take an outright majority and form government.   
The experience of Thailand highlights not just how a political vacuum left by 
the  absence  of  class-based  organisations  can  be  fertile  ground  for  populist 
representation.  It  also  reveals  how  many  middle  class  NGOs  and  civil  society 
organisations,  including  even  progressive  groups,  can  be  vulnerable  to  forming 
alliances  with  conservative  forces  in  a  period  of  acute  class  antagonisms. 
Notwithstanding  the  complexity  of  these  contexts  and  the  political  choices  to  be 
made, the ideological and organisational limits to single-issue advocacy groups in 
particular are evident.
46 Mass class-based representation is not part of the logic of 
their work. Indeed, it is seen as threatening to it. 
Parallels  are  acute  with  the  Philippines,  where  wealthy  former  movie  star 
Joseph  Estrada  won  a  landslide  presidential  election  in  1998  espousing  pro-poor 
measures and anti-elite rhetoric.
47 Ironically, Estrada’s neoliberal privatisation and 
deregulation programme implemented to yield private rents to particular interests was 
among the long list of alleged power abuses by him. Ultimately, People Power 2 in 
January  2001  followed  corruption  allegations,  and  related  impeachment  charges, 
concerning  Estrada,  his  family  and  associates  in  an  illegal  lottery.  In  contrast  to 
People Power 1 in 1986, though, the middle class and its organisations, including 
prominent  leftists  groups  like  Akbayan  and  Bayan  Muna,  were  integral  to  street 
demonstrations that combined with efforts of business elites and the Church hierarchy 
in the coup to remove Estrada.
48  
To be sure, Estrada’s critics and opponents comprised a contradictory range of 
interests  and  groups.  Yet  the  abiding  importance  of  ‘good  governance’  contained 
differences. However, an unsuccessful People Power 3 four months later by Manila’s 
urban squatters and others amongst the poorest in Philippines to reinstate Estrada 
underlined  just  how  important  class  was  to  divergent  positions  the  president.  For 
many  middle  class  activists,  Church  leaders  and  academics,  People  Power  3 
supporters were misguided victims of a morally deficient culture of clientelism.
49 As 
Hutchison argues though, such analyses underestimate the extent to which the poor 
attempted  to  assert  political  demands  and  rights  through  support  for  populist 
representation, as opposed to having been captured or subjugated by a patron.
 50 From 
the  poor’s  perspective,  Estrada’s  corruption  was  not  exceptional  for  a  Philippine 12	
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politician;  his  prosecution  was  more  to  do  with  the  threat  he  posed  to  privileged 
interests. 
51 	
 ﾠ
Given that the paucity of effective class-based organisations championing the 
lot  of  the  poor  seems  unlikely  to  be  redressed  in  the  foreseeable  future,  further 
episodes  of  populist  electoral  triumph  are  very  possible.  As  Thompson  warns, 
‘Renewed populism may be the consequence of the probable failure of reform.’
52 
Intensified  inequalities  associated  with  capitalist  development  do  not  necessarily 
favour coalitions supportive of democratic representation. 
 
Consensus Representation in Singapore  
Whereas in the Philippines and Thailand different versions of People Power have 
been decisive in the fall and/or return of authoritarianism, it has played no role in 
Singapore. However, the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) has been concerned that 
new social forces, interests and conflicts associated with capitalist development might 
result  in  gains  for  independent  civil  society  and  political  opposition.  It  has  thus 
created  avenues  for  political  participation  within  parliamentary  and  extra-
parliamentary spheres. Functional and elitist conceptions of representation, proffered 
over a rights-based democratic politics, are integral to this.  
This direction is linked to the consolidation and expansion of state capitalism, 
which has enhanced the power of technocratic elites predisposed towards bureaucratic 
and  administrative  techniques  of  political  control  and  governance.  Consequently, 
emphasis on consultation is meant not just to limit the boundaries and conduct of 
political  conflict,  it  also  reflects  a  technocratic  view  of  politics  as  principally  a 
problem-solving, rather than normative, exercise that can usefully harness relevant 
information and expertise.  
Importantly, civil society wasn’t always emasculated. Indeed, the PAP came 
to power with self-government in 1959 through an alliance of leftist and nationalist 
forces controlling trade unions and student, cultural and ethnic organisations, on the 
one hand, and right-wing middle-class nationalists on the other. Inherent tensions in 
this marriage of convenience became unmanageable in office and by July 1961 a 
breakaway faction formed the Barisan Sosialis (BS) or Socialist Front, stripping the 
PAP of grass-root networks and mass mobilisation capacity.  
In response, the ruling party and state were effectively merged. This facilitated 
the  development  of  grassroots  para-political  institutions  and  state-owned  media 13	
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through which PAP ideology was disseminated, while the state-sponsored and PAP-
affiliated National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) emerged as pivotal to the ruling 
party’s  policy  implementation  and  electoral  support  mobilisation.  Meanwhile, 
independent civil society organisations critical of the PAP, especially independent 
labour organisations, were all but extinguished. 
The  social  foundations  for  consensus  representation  were  not  complete, 
though, until a particular form of state capitalism took root. This started with public 
housing that generated not just electoral support but the capacity of the PAP state for 
social  and  political  engineering.
53  Initial  state  economic  roles  supporting 
industrialisation  extended  to  direct  investments  by  government-linked  companies 
(GLCs) that dramatically escalated, diversified and internationalised as the economy 
grew. Opportunities for the domestic bourgeoisie have thus been heavily conditioned 
by, and dependent on, articulation with state capitalism. Meanwhile, much of the city-
state’s middle class is either employed in government departments, statutory bodies, 
GLCs or indirectly derives its livelihood from servicing state capitalism through the 
provision of commercial, legal or other professional services.  
The net effect of Singapore’s brand of state capitalism is limited space for 
independent  economic  and  social  bases  that  could  be  harnessed  by  critics  and 
opponents  of  the  PAP.  This  structural  relationship  helps  explain  not  just  the 
effectiveness of repressive legislation and the limits to electoral politics as opposition 
parties  are  denied  organic  social  bases,  but  also  the  growing  propensity  for,  and 
vulnerability to, various forms of PAP state political and ideological co-option. The 
institutionalisation of consensus representation is a key aspect of core element of such 
co-option.  
According to Goh Chok Tong, Prime Minister between 1989 and 2004: ‘What 
a  plural  society  like  ours  needs  is  a  tradition  of  government  which  emphasises 
consensus instead of division, that includes rather than excludes, and that tries to 
maximise  the  participation  of  the  population  in  the  national  effort,  instead  of 
minimizing it.’
54 This is also considered functional for elite rule, a point current Prime 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong was explicit about: ‘In a rapidly changing environment, 
much of the valuable up-to-date information is held by people at the frontline. Policy 
makers must draw on this knowledge to understand realities on the ground, and reach 
better solutions’.
55 14	
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The first major such initiative in consensus representation was the Feedback 
Unit, established in 1985 and renamed Reaching Everyone for Active Citizenry@ 
Home (REACH) in 2006. REACH’s direction is broadly set by a Supervisory Panel, 
whose head is appointed by the government and is invariably a current PAP MP, as 
are many others on the Panel. The omission of opposition politicians and independent 
civil society activists is precisely because the idea is to foster a political ‘consensus,’ 
not  competition.  REACH’s  extensive  mechanisms  of  consultation  atomise  and/or 
compartmentalise  constituencies,  militating  against  the  formation  of  political 
coalitions beyond specific sectoral or policy issues. One way this is done is though 
individualised  participation,  absent  of  intermediary  groups;  in  effect,  individuals 
represent  themselves.  Another  is  by  constructing  the  social  categories  to  be 
represented or by working closely with preferred existing groups. 
Online consultation channels, which account for the vast bulk of the feedback, 
have been especially significant in promoting individual forms of participation. These 
include:  e-consultation  papers  (eCPs)  published  by  government  departments  and 
agencies and seeking either targeted or open expressions of views through SMS and 
email; e-Townhall webchats to engage citizens following major government policy 
announcements; the Discussion Corner which takes place on the REACH website and 
often requesting people’s responses to certain facts, arguments or issues that REACH 
has effectively defined as a problem; the General Feedback channel, where citizens 
are linked to relevant government departments that subsequently reply directly to the 
participant rather than engage in any a public debate.  
In-person engagement includes Dialogue Sessions, which are generally small 
and  informal,  involving  pre-policy  and  post-policy  consultations  chaired  by  two 
Supervisory Panel members. In principle open to the general public, in practice this is 
largely through invitations to ‘strategic partners’: ‘organisations the Unit works with 
to widen and deepen its reach to the people.’
56 This has involved groups already with 
a record of working co-operatively with the ruling party. There is also Policy Study 
Workgroups (PSW), chaired by people from the private or social sector, appointed by 
the  Supervisory  Panel,  that  undertake  policy  studies  and  submit  proposals  to 
government at annual conferences.  
A separate category of meetings that is less policy-driven is the Tea Sessions, 
chaired by a PAP MP and one other Supervisory Panel member. They are broken up 
into one or other of 14 discrete groups of Singaporeans, including students, youths, 15	
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women,  professionals,  ethnic  communities,  ‘heartlanders’,  small  and  medium 
enterprises,  and  multinational  corporations.  Observations  from  participants 
themselves suggest that this compartmentalisation of issues conditions discussions in 
the Dialogue and Tea Sessions.
57  
Clearly,  state-sponsored  consultation  through  REACH  is  designed  to  steer 
political  participation  towards  the  limited  exercise  of  helping  to  improve  or 
implement PAP government policy. In this respect, it is possible to point to some 
positive outcomes.
58 However, the way in which different groups and individuals are 
consulted militates against the formation of political coalitions around, and indeed 
beyond, specific sectoral or policy issues. That is the greater political significance of 
REACH. 
The  other  major  institution  promoting  consensus  representation  is  the 
Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP), introduced in 1990. NMPs involve the 
most concerted attempt to challenge to the authority of democratic representation in 
favour of functionalist and elitist alternatives. Embryonic civil society organisations 
have also been targeted in an effort to discourage both their maturation as independent 
organisations and limit their potential to form coalitions amongst themselves. This 
initiative demonstrates that the PAP recognizes that new social forces, interests and 
conflicts associated with rapid capitalist expansion require a political accommodation. 
NMPs are appointed by the President for terms of up to two-and-half years on 
the advice of a Special Select Committee appointed by Parliament. They cannot vote 
on money bills, bills to alter the Constitution, or motions of no confidence in the 
government but can speak on these issues and vote and speak on any other bills and 
motions.  Legislation  altering  the  Constitution  providing  for  NMPs  referred  to 
‘independent  and  non-partisan  views’  in  the  selection  criteria.
59  However,  Prime 
Minister Goh made mention not only of the value of incorporating talented people 
with special expertise in the professions, commerce, industry, social services, cultural 
domains but also of sections of society currently under-represented in Parliament.   
Since 1990, there have been 76 NMP appointments. One striking theme is a 
sustained bias towards people from the professions and academia. In addition to being 
appointed in their own right, academics and professionals have often been appointed 
as  notional  representatives  of  women,  ethnic  minorities  or  as  champions  of 
environmentalism or social welfare. In this way, the link between formal educational 16	
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credentials and public policy expertise is reinforced at the same time as functional 
groups are politically incorporated.  
The  most  heavily  ‘represented’  single  category  of  NMPs  has  involved  the 
business sector, mainly senior past or present figures from within peak employer and 
business  bodies.  Singapore’s  increasing  exposure  to  economic  globalisation  has 
brought continuing challenges for the private sector. The consolidation and expansion 
of GLCs has not been without its critics from the local business community either. As 
the PAP has more vigorously embraced economic globalisation in recent decades, 
material  inequalities  have  also  widened  significantly  in  Singapore.  Increasingly 
exorbitant ministerial and senior civil servant salaries justified in elitist terms have 
only  compounded  working  class  resentment  about  rising  inequalities.  Generous 
representation of the NTUC in NMP appointments is thus a symbolic statement to 
counteract the idea of NTUC impotence.   
The number of NMP appointments from embryonic civil society organisations 
has  not  been  high,  but  their  strategic  significance  has.  Thus,  the  appointment  of 
orthopaedic surgeon Kanwaljit Soin was a conspicuous attempt to encourage activists 
within the moderate but independent feminist Association of Women for Action and 
Research (AWARE) towards direct engagement within a PAP-controlled institution. 
Similarly, Braema Mathiaparanam, foundation President of Transient Workers Count 
Too  (TWC2),  which  advocates  on  behalf  of  foreign  domestic  labour,  was  also 
appointed. The Nature Society of Singapore (NSS) has also been recognised through 
the appointment of orthopaedic surgeon Geh Min – the first female president of the 
NSS.  Like  AWARE  and  TWC2,  while  not  a  radical  organisation,  NSS’s 
independence and comparative activism from the late 1980s posed a question about 
the adequacy of existing structures of political cooption on issues of potential appeal 
to Singapore’s expanding middle class. 
The other attempted co-option of an independent organisation has involved the 
Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP), established in 1991 out of frustration 
with  Mendaki  –  the  officially  sanctioned  council  representing  ethnic  Malays  and 
controlled by Malay PAP MPs. The PAP tolerance of AMP independence is in part a 
function  of  ruling  party  preference  for  problems  of  socio-economic  disadvantage 
being viewed through an ethnic rather than a class prism. AMP Chairman Imram bin 
Mohamed was among the 1994 NMP appointments, a move attempting to reinforce 
this ethnic framework. 17	
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  While an evaluation of the full impact of consensus representation is beyond 
the scope of this essay, it clearly has appeal to sections of the professional middle 
class in particular and more generally promotes modes of political engagement that 
reinforce political fragmentation unhelpful for political coalition building. Yet, as the 
2011 election results also reveal, with forty per cent of voters rejecting the PAP, 
consensus representation has not been able to completely absorb and neutralise public 
concerns about the accentuating inequalities of capitalist development. 
 
Challenging Ethnic Localism 
In  contrast  with  Singapore,  the  authoritarian  ruling  Barisan  Nasional ( BN) 
government  in  Malaysia  has  not  averted  People  Power.  The  1998-1999  reformasi 
movement  was  short-lived  and  unsuccessful,  but  it  gave  expression  to  a 
comparatively vibrant civil society. Subsequent street demonstrations and opposition 
political  coalitions  forged  prior  to  the  2008  general  election  also  underline  the 
continuing  potential  of  independent  collective  action  in  Malaysia.  Moreover, 
substantial  2008  opposition  electoral  gains  followed  a  campaign  with  the  most 
concerted attempt yet to challenge a core ideological and institutional foundation of 
the  regime  –  ethnic-based  political  representation.  The  question  is  whether  this 
challenge  further  galvanises  or  splinters  civil  society  forces  in  a  push  for  more 
democratic representation?  
   Since  the  introduction  of  the  New  Economic  Policy  (NEP),  capitalist 
development  has  been  integral  to  ethnic  Malay  power.  Thus,  the  centrepiece  of 
affirmative action to improve Malays’ socio-economic position was the promotion of 
a Bumiputera domestic bourgeoisie. As a corollary, the extent and power of Malay 
professional bureaucrats was greatly expanded through the public sector and GLCs.
60 
However, as inequalities generated by capitalism have become more acute and state 
power abuses more evident, the rationale for ethnic-based political representation has 
come  under  more  scrutiny.  Yet  the  civil  society  through  which  this  scrutiny  is 
conducted is shaped by a history unfavourable to strong class-based organisations.  
  Trade unions were influential in immediate post-War politics, notably when 
the Malayan Communist Party-affiliated Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions 
was at its peak.
61 Even then, though, membership was predominantly ethnic Chinese, 
organised along communal lines, with little ethnic Malay involvement – a pattern 
related  to  the  ethnic  division  of  labour  fostered  under  colonial  capitalism. 18	
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Subsequently, radical unions were repressed and apolitical unions sponsored by the 
British  through  anti-communist  middle-class  English-educated  ethnic  Indian 
leaders.
62  The  sustained  repression  of  the  leftist  Labour  Party  and  ultimately  its 
deregistration in 1972 was another blow to developing broad working class political 
representation. And while capitalist industrialisation in recent decades boosted the 
ethnic Malay proletariat, Malays remain least represented by unions – the Malaysian 
Trades Union Congress represented just 10 per cent of the Malaysian workforce in 
2010.
63  
  Although  their  numbers  are  not  on  the  scale  as  in  the  Philippines  and 
Thailand, NGOs have also dominated civil society in Malaysia. By the 1990s this 
broadly comprised two elements: ethno-religious organisations largely reflecting the 
NEP agenda; and urban-based organisations led by middle-class non-Malays, often 
pursuing single-issue agendas of consumer rights, human rights and good governance.  
It was through reformasi that these elements came together.
64 The sacking and 
imprisonment  of  Deputy  Prime  Minister  Anwar  Ibrahim  radicalised  many  Islamic 
organisations and also heightened internal tensions to the dominant party in the BN, 
the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), creating political opportunities 
for critics of the ruling party and regime.
65 Thus, in the mass demonstrations that 
ensued during 1998-1999, calls for the repeal of legislation restricting media and civil 
liberties,  attacks  on  corruption,  cronyism  and  nepotism,  and  demands  for  Islamic 
solutions to the moral decay underlying the governance malaise combined. However, 
the  electoral  coalition  emerging  from  this  movement,  Barisan  Alternatif ( BA  or 
Alternative Front), was out pointed by BN at the 1999 and 2004 polls. For many non-
Malay voters, reformasi was viewed as principally a Malay-Islamic movement.
 66 
  By the 2008 election, though, some of the initial overtures in cross-ethnic 
political coalitions found more fertile ground as the contradictions of capitalism under 
the NEP manifested in declining economic performance, growing material disparities 
within and between ethnic categories, inadequacies and political biases in regulatory, 
legal and other institutions, and religious insensitivities. Links between NGOs and 
opposition parties had also deepened.
67In November 2007, around 40,000 assembled 
in central Kuala Lumpur to demand electoral reform following revelations of previous 
vote-rigging and condemning the Election Commission for political partisanship. This 
was organised by the Bersih Coalition (Coalition for Free and Fair Elections) and 19	
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involved cooperation between various human rights NGOs and opposition parties, 
marking a new level of cross-ethnic participation.
68  
Despite a subsequent police ban on public rallies, within weeks 30,000 people 
responded to a call to the streets by the Hindu Rights Action Front (HINDRAF). 
HINDRAF’s  concerns  included  the  demolition  of  Hindu  temples,  but  structural 
discrimination  and  socio-economic  marginalisation  is  especially  acute  for  ethnic 
Indians. Authorities deployed 5,000 riot police and water cannons to disperse the 
crowd, arrested at least 240 people and detained organisers under the Internal Security 
Act.
69 
  Crucially, Anwar articulated a clear alternative to the BN’s ethnic politics, in 
contrast with the reformasi experience, that helped win over larger numbers of non-
Malays. As de facto leader of Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR or People’s Justice Party), 
he called for the NEP’s end and announced his party’s New Economic Agenda, under 
which social need, not ethnicity, was the guiding principle of resource allocation. 
Furthermore,  by  endorsing  the  HINDRAF  struggle,  Anwar  defied  the  ‘prevailing 
Malay-Muslim  sentiment  which  treated  HINDRAF  challenge  as  a  threat  to  the 
dominance of Islam.’
70 This demonstration of an ethnic-Malay leader standing up for 
the rights of the most marginalised non-Malays powerfully symbolised a different 
conception  of  political  representation.  Ethnic  concerns  did  not  require  ethnic 
representation.
71  
   Although the BN was returned to government in 2008, it did so against a 
substantial voter backlash giving it just over half the votes cast, and the first ever loss 
of its two-third parliamentary seat majority needed for constitutional reforms. BN also 
lost government in five states, the previous worst performance being two. Opposition 
party  seats  in  federal  parliament  rose  from  10  per  cent  to  over  30  per  cent. 
Significantly,  the  most  multi-ethnic  of  the  opposition  parties,  PKR,  attracted  the 
highest votes but Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS or Pan Malaysian Islamic Party) and 
the Democratic Action Party (DAP) also made major gains. The largest ethnic vote 
swings to the opposition were estimated to have been by ethnic Indians (35 per cent), 
ethnic Chinese (30 per cent) and ethnic Malays (5 per cent).
72 The new electoral 
coalition  of  opposition  parties  under  Pakatan  Rakyat ( PR  or  People’s  Alliance) 
achieved what Maznah describes as an ‘optimum multiethnic consensus.’
73  
Hardest hit BN party members were precisely those whose rationale was to 
capture  votes  of  minority  ethnic  constituencies:  the  Malayan  Chinese  Association 20	
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(MCA),  Gerakan,  and  the  Malayan  Indian  Congress  (MIC).  Under  the  BN 
‘consociationalism’ formula for determining which parties contest what seats, ethnic 
composition  of  the  electorate  is  principally  determinant.  Hence,  UMNO  contests 
Malay majority constituencies, MCA or Gerakan Chinese majority constituencies and 
a certain number of contests are reserved for MIC where there is significant ethnic 
Indian constituency. Broadly, Federal and State government appointments of Senators 
and local councillors also reflect this pattern of political representation.
74  
However, the abysmal performance of MIC, MCA and Gerakan at the polls 
has upset the logic and stability of consociationalism. The inability of the MIC to 
retain the votes of ethnic Indians, for example, led to Prime Minister Najib launching 
the new BN-sympathetic ethnic-Indian-based Malaysian Makkal Sakti (People Power) 
Party. He also warned Malaysia’s ethnic Chinese community that if they don’t vote 
for  the  MCA  they  lose  representation  in  government.
75  Yet,  given  the  lack  of 
influence by the MCA (and MIC and Gerakan) within the BN, the threat may fall on 
deaf  electoral  ears.  Meanwhile,  Najib  has  recast  the  ruling  coalition’s  ideological 
appeal to non-Malays with his 1Malaysia propaganda campaign, whose main slogan 
is ‘People First. Performance Now.’  
   For the PR, though, progressing non-ethnic politics and representation is no 
simple  task.  To  be  sure,  there  have  been  significant  rhetorical  and  practical 
reinforcements of this ideal. Anwar, for example, directly confronted racialist notions 
of  Malay  supremacy  that  recently  resurfaced  as  part  of  the  defence  of  the  NEP. 
Asserting that most people living under poverty are ethnic Malays, he proclaimed: 
‘What type of Malay supremacy is this? We should instead abolish the question of 
ethnicity and solve the problem of poverty. Those that will benefit are of course the 
poor; the Malays and Bumiputera in the villages, Indians in the estates and Chinese in 
towns. That is what we should focus on.’
76  
  Some policy initiatives and commitments by PR state governments have also 
been  encouraging,  including:  Perak’s  PAS  Chief  Minister  Mahamad  Nizar 
Jamalludin’s allocation of state land to nine independent Chinese schools; pledges by 
Penang’s DAP Chief Minister, Lim Eng Guan, to support Islamic religious schools 
with  state  funds;
77  a  proposal  by  Selangor’s  PR  Chief  Minister,  Abdul  Khalid 
Ibrahim, to open up some tertiary institute entrance at the hitherto Malay exclusive 
Universiti  Tecknologi  MARA  as  well  as  to  appoint  a  non-Malay  to  a  temporary 21	
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position  in  a  state  GLC.  However,  the  last  two  initiatives,  in  particular,  aroused 
concerted opposition and effective resistance from vested interests.
78  
  Within PR itself, though, a multi-ethnic – let alone a genuinely non-ethnic – 
concept of political representation is also far from asserting itself as the ascendant 
ideological framework. In effect, the process of determining seat contest allocation at 
the 2008 election was not fundamentally different from BN’s: PAS stood in ethnic 
Malay majority electorates; the DAP in ethnic Chinese majority electorates; and PKR 
in the most ethnically mixed electorates. As difficult and protracted negotiations over 
which  electorates  respective  PR  parties  would  contest  in  the  2011  Sarawak  state 
election revealed, breaking from that mould will not be easy. Friction mainly centred 
around DAP reluctance to concede ethnic-Chinese dominated electorates for the PKR 
to contest. PKR Vice President Tian Chua argued that, as a multi-racial party, PKR 
needed to maintain a minimum presence in Chinese-majority urban areas.
79 
  Furthermore,  following  the  2008  election  relations  between  PR  and 
HINDRAF have soured, the latter contending working class Indian issues have been 
neglected  by  PR.  Yet  HINDRAF’s  solution  might  not  help  realise  the  goal  of 
transcending  communalism.  In  December  2010,  the  HINDRAF-affiliated  Human 
Rights Party (HRP) issued an ultimatum to the PR leadership to allow it straight 
contests with the BN in 15 parliamentary seats and 38 state seats in the next general 
election or face the prospect of three-cornered contests. The seats it nominated not 
only contained significant ethnic Indian composition but also were predominantly PR 
held. ‘MIC is given at least nine parliament seats and 20 state assembly seats on a 
silver platter. Why can’t we be allocated some, too?’ asked HRP pro-tem secretary-
general P. Uthayakumar.
80  
For this and other stances, HINDRAF and HPR have been accused of seeking 
not to combat inequality in general but to extract comparable affirmative action for 
Indians  as  for  Malays  under  the  NEP,  notably  from  the  Parti  Sosialis  Malaysia 
(Socialist Party of Malaysia).
81 Yet these stances are borne out of a context within 
which there is a dearth of cohesive working class organisations to link up with. There 
is also a degree of unease from certain middle class-led NGOs about the style and 
content of HINDRAF demands – some of which could only be addressed through 
explicit redistributive programmes that the middle class has been equally ambivalent 
about in other parts of Southeast Asia. This is not to say that class-based issues are 
always eclipsed where social justice agendas are advocated -- whether within political 22	
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parties or movements like Bersih – but their prospects are highly contingent given the 
absence of a class-oriented programme and class-based representation. 
  As differences over ways to combat prevailing ideologies of ethnic political 
representation play out, recourse to street demonstrations is likely to continue to play 
an important role – either as a supplement to, or substitute for, existing forms of 
political  representation.  And  official  intimidation  appears  unlikely  to  quell  such 
activity either, including the arrest of Uthayakumar and 108 other demonstrators at an 
HPR  anti-racism  rally  in  Kuala  Lumpur  during  February  2011,  and  of  18  people 
demonstrating for a minimum wage and against high living costs in May. Indeed, 
against the background of the 2011 Sarawak state election, a Bersih 2.0 March for 
Democracy was held on 9 July to restate the case for free and fair elections, despite it 
being declared illegal by authorities. Home Minister Hishammuddin Hussein even 
declared wearing yellow t-shirts supporting the rally illegal.
82 The 10,000 protesters 
who  attended  the  rally  were  confronted  with  water  cannon,  tear  gas  and  other 
intimidation, with more than 1,600 arrests. Amnesty International called the response 
‘the  worst  campaign  of  repression  in  the  country  for  years.’
83  This  over-reaction 
suggests  the  BN  is  mindful  of  how  quickly  and  unexpectedly  the  Arab  Spring 
unfolded. 
Conclusion 
This select examination of innovations in, and struggles over, political representation 
in Southeast Asia highlights the importance of understanding not just the extent of 
civil  society  forces  involved  but  also  the  complexion  of  those  forces.  Dynamic 
alliances and conflicts between different interests in civil society can both produce 
People  Power  and  damage  the  prospects  of  democratic  representation.  Competing 
versions of People Power are also possible, reflecting significant differences in class 
interest contributing to contrasting degrees of receptiveness to democratic, populist, 
consensus and localist ideologies and institutions of political representation.  
An  especially  important  theme  across  Southeast  Asia  is  the  influence  of 
consensus  representation  ideologies  among  the  middle  class.  Although  the  above 
analysis  concentrated  on  how  this  has  developed  in  Singapore,  consensus 
representation  is  present  in  varying  degrees  and  forms  in  authoritarian  and  post-
authoritarian  regimes.  In  the  Philippines,  Indonesia  and  Thailand,  for  example, 
community-based  participation  has  been  a  feature  of  World  Bank-driven  poverty 
reduction programmes. However, these modes of participation favour targeted and 23	
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often administratively defined communities and a technocratic conception of politics. 
Avenues  for  representing  or  addressing  conflicts  rooted  in  social  cleavages  are 
eschewed  in  favour  of  different  cleavages  that  divert  attention  from  class 
relationships, such as between local and national groups, between different ethnic 
groups, and between users and providers of public services such as irrigation.
84  
Often, then, consensus and localist ideologies of representation are articulated 
with each other, though this is always a function of the specific dynamic coalitions of 
interests competing to define political institutions. As the Indonesian experience of 
political decentralisation in the last decade demonstrates, localist ideologies can also 
be  harnessed  to  crude  forms  of  predatory  power  and  interest  that  fundamentally 
violate the sorts of rational, technocratic governance embraced by many in the middle 
class.
85  Similarly,  religion  rather  than  Weberian  rationality  is  ideologically 
incorporated within separatist movements seeking localist political representation in 
Mindanao in the Philippines, Southern Thailand and Aceh in Indonesia.  
Importantly, certain forms of democratic representation can also be used to 
obstruct  the  prospects  of  cohesive  class-based  organisations  in  Southeast  Asia. 
Following People Power 1 in the Philippines, for example, established oligarchs and 
their political allies understood democratic participation had to be accommodated but 
they sought to minimize the prospect of radical reform. What transpired included the 
introduction of party-lists for the House of Representatives, which preserves 20 per 
cent of seats for marginalised social sectors. This has facilitated a political pluralism 
characterised by a continued disaggregation of interests and policy issues among the 
challengers to traditional political parties who end up competing with each other.
86 
The party-list system also offers NGOs an opportunity for validation as stand-alone 
entities, which many take in preference to broader alliance building. 
  The key point is that competing attempts in Southeast Asia to privilege one or 
other notion of political representation, or to articulate these in particular ways, have 
been  deeply  affected  by  legacies  of  past  conflicts  and  the  continuing  impacts  of 
capitalist development. These factors have seriously limited the capacity of class-
based organisations to play decisive roles in the formation of coalitions that determine 
ascendant  ideologies  and  institutions  of  representation.  In  this  context,  ideologies 
indifferent to systemic economic, social and political inequalities can find institutional 
expression in various alternatives to democratic political representation and, indeed, 
through innovations in democratic representation itself. For this reason, protracted 24	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
struggle  over  preferred  forms  of  political  representation  often  follows  momentous 
episodes of People Power – whether in Southeast Asia or elsewhere.  
 
 
Notes 
	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
1	
 ﾠK 	
 ﾠJ a y a s u r i y a 	
 ﾠ& 	
 ﾠG 	
 ﾠRodan,	
 ﾠ ‘Beyond	
 ﾠ hybrid	
 ﾠ regimes:	
 ﾠ more	
 ﾠ participation,	
 ﾠ less	
 ﾠ
contestation	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠSoutheast	
 ﾠAsia’,	
 ﾠDemocratization,	
 ﾠ14(5),	
 ﾠ2007,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ773-ﾭ‐794;	
 ﾠW	
 ﾠ
Case,	
 ﾠPolitics	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠSoutheast	
 ﾠAsia:	
 ﾠDemocracy	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠLess,	
 ﾠRichmond:	
 ﾠCurzon,	
 ﾠ2002.	
 ﾠ
2	
 ﾠD	
 ﾠSlater,	
 ﾠOrdering	
 ﾠPower:	
 ﾠContentious	
 ﾠPolitics	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠAuthoritarian	
 ﾠLeviathans	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ
Southeast	
 ﾠAsia,	
 ﾠCambridge:	
 ﾠCambridge	
 ﾠUniversity	
 ﾠPress,	
 ﾠ2010.	
 ﾠ
3	
 ﾠJayasuriya	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠRodan,	
 ﾠ‘Beyond	
 ﾠhybrid	
 ﾠregimes’.	
 ﾠ
4	
 ﾠW	
 ﾠArmbrust,	
 ﾠ‘A	
 ﾠrevolution	
 ﾠagainst	
 ﾠneoliberalism?	
 ﾠAljazeera.net,	
 ﾠ24	
 ﾠFebruary	
 ﾠ
2011,	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠ
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/02/20112241431524962
1.html,	
 ﾠaccessed	
 ﾠ18	
 ﾠMay	
 ﾠ2011.	
 ﾠ
5 T Carothers, ‘The end of the transition paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 
2002, pp 17-33; S Levitsky and L A Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid 
Regimes After the Cold War, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010; F Volpi, 
‘Pseudo-democracy in the Muslim world’, Third World Quarterly, 25(6), 2004, pp 
1061-1078.	
 ﾠ
6	
 ﾠSee,	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠexample,	
 ﾠM	
 ﾠWigell,	
 ﾠ‘Mapping	
 ﾠ“hybrid	
 ﾠregimes”:	
 ﾠtypes	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠconcepts	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ
comparative	
 ﾠpolitics’,	
 ﾠDemocratization,	
 ﾠ15(2),	
 ﾠ2008,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ230-ﾭ‐250.	
 ﾠ
7	
 ﾠFor	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠreview	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠliterature	
 ﾠsee	
 ﾠG	
 ﾠRodan	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠK	
 ﾠJayasuriya,	
 ﾠ‘Hybrid	
 ﾠRegimes	
 ﾠ–	
 ﾠ
a	
 ﾠSocial	
 ﾠFoundations	
 ﾠApproach’	
 ﾠ,	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠJ	
 ﾠHaynes	
 ﾠ(ed),	
 ﾠRoutledge	
 ﾠHandbook	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
Democratization,	
 ﾠLondon:	
 ﾠRoutledge,	
 ﾠ2011	
 ﾠ(forthcoming).	
 ﾠ
8	
 ﾠT	
 ﾠCarothers,	
 ﾠ‘The	
 ﾠend	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠtransition	
 ﾠparadigm.’	
 ﾠ
9	
 ﾠSee,	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠexample,	
 ﾠLevitsky	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠWay,	
 ﾠCompetitive	
 ﾠAuthoritarianism	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠM	
 ﾠ
Ottaway,	
 ﾠDemocracy	
 ﾠChallenged:	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠRise	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠSemi-ﾭAuthoritarianism,	
 ﾠWashington,	
 ﾠ
DC:	
 ﾠCarnegie	
 ﾠEndowment	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠInternational	
 ﾠPeace,	
 ﾠ2003.	
 ﾠ
10	
 ﾠK	
 ﾠHewison	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠG	
 ﾠRodan,	
 ﾠ‘The	
 ﾠEbb	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠFlow	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠCivil	
 ﾠSociety	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠDecline	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
Left	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠSoutheast	
 ﾠAsia’,	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠG.	
 ﾠRodan	
 ﾠ(ed),	
 ﾠPolitical	
 ﾠOppositions	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠIndustrialising	
 ﾠ
Asia,	
 ﾠLondon:	
 ﾠRoutledge,	
 ﾠ1996,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ40-ﾭ‐71.	
 ﾠ
11	
 ﾠGeoff	
 ﾠEley,	
 ﾠForging	
 ﾠDemocracy:	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠHistory	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠLeft	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠEurope,	
 ﾠ1850-ﾭ2000,	
 ﾠ
Oxford:	
 ﾠOxford	
 ﾠUniversity	
 ﾠPress,	
 ﾠ2002.	
 ﾠ
12	
 ﾠG	
 ﾠRodan	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠK	
 ﾠJayasuriya,	
 ﾠ‘Capitalist	
 ﾠdevelopment,	
 ﾠregime	
 ﾠtransitions	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠnew	
 ﾠ
forms	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠauthoritarianism	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠAsia’,	
 ﾠPacific	
 ﾠReview,	
 ﾠ22(1),	
 ﾠ2009,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ23-ﾭ‐48.	
 ﾠ
13	
 ﾠF	
 ﾠC	
 ﾠDeyo,	
 ﾠ‘Southeast	
 ﾠAsian	
 ﾠindustrial	
 ﾠlabour:	
 ﾠstructural	
 ﾠdemobilisation	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠ
political	
 ﾠtransformation’,	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠG	
 ﾠRodan,	
 ﾠK	
 ﾠHewison	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠR	
 ﾠRobison	
 ﾠ(eds),	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠPolitical	
 ﾠ
Economy	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠSoutheast	
 ﾠAsia:	
 ﾠMarkets,	
 ﾠPower	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠContestation,	
 ﾠMelbourne:	
 ﾠOxford	
 ﾠ
University	
 ﾠPress,	
 ﾠ2006,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ283-ﾭ‐304.	
 ﾠ25	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
14	
 ﾠA	
 ﾠGamble,	
 ﾠAn	
 ﾠIntroduction	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠModern	
 ﾠSocial	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠPolitical	
 ﾠThought,	
 ﾠBasingstoke:	
 ﾠ
Macmillan,	
 ﾠ1987,	
 ﾠp.257.	
 ﾠ
15	
 ﾠ See	
 ﾠ P	
 ﾠ P	
 ﾠ Houtzager	
 ﾠ &	
 ﾠ A	
 ﾠ G	
 ﾠ Lavalle,	
 ﾠ ‘Civil	
 ﾠ society’s	
 ﾠ claims	
 ﾠ to	
 ﾠ political	
 ﾠ
representation	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ Brazil’,	
 ﾠ Studies	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ Comparative	
 ﾠ International	
 ﾠ Development,	
 ﾠ
45(1),	
 ﾠ 2010,	
 ﾠ pp	
 ﾠ 1-ﾭ‐29;	
 ﾠ R	
 ﾠ B	
 ﾠ Collier	
 ﾠ &	
 ﾠ S	
 ﾠ Handlin,	
 ﾠ Reorganizing	
 ﾠ Popular	
 ﾠ Politics:	
 ﾠ
Participation	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠNew	
 ﾠInterest	
 ﾠRegime	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠLatin	
 ﾠAmerica,	
 ﾠUniversity	
 ﾠPark,	
 ﾠPA:	
 ﾠ
Pennsylvania	
 ﾠState	
 ﾠUniversity	
 ﾠPress,	
 ﾠ2009.	
 ﾠ
16	
 ﾠPasuk	
 ﾠPhongpaichit	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠC	
 ﾠBaker,	
 ﾠ‘Thaksin’s	
 ﾠpopulism’,	
 ﾠJournal	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠContemporary	
 ﾠ
Asia,	
 ﾠ38(1),	
 ﾠ2008,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ62-ﾭ‐83.	
 ﾠ
17	
 ﾠSome	
 ﾠsections	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠpoor	
 ﾠdidn’t	
 ﾠfare	
 ﾠso	
 ﾠwell	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠThaksin’s	
 ﾠpolicies,	
 ﾠsuch	
 ﾠas	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠhill	
 ﾠpeoples	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠNorthern	
 ﾠThailand	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠSouthern	
 ﾠMalay	
 ﾠMuslims,	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠlatter	
 ﾠ
subjected	
 ﾠinstead	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠhuman	
 ﾠrights	
 ﾠabuses	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠstate	
 ﾠauthorities.	
 ﾠSee	
 ﾠInternational	
 ﾠ
Crisis	
 ﾠGroup,	
 ﾠThailand’s	
 ﾠEmergency	
 ﾠDecree:	
 ﾠNo	
 ﾠSolution,	
 ﾠAsia	
 ﾠReport,	
 ﾠ105,	
 ﾠ18	
 ﾠ
November	
 ﾠ2005.	
 ﾠ
18	
 ﾠM 	
 ﾠK 	
 ﾠC o n n o r s , 	
 ﾠDemocracy	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ National	
 ﾠ Identity	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ Thailand,	
 ﾠ Copenhagen:	
 ﾠ
Nordic	
 ﾠInstitute	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠAsian	
 ﾠStudies,	
 ﾠ2007,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ215-ﾭ‐218.	
 ﾠ
19	
 ﾠHewison	
 ﾠargues	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthis	
 ﾠwithdrawal	
 ﾠwas	
 ﾠout	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠconcern	
 ﾠthat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠmilitary	
 ﾠwas	
 ﾠ
not	
 ﾠsufficiently	
 ﾠunified	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠensure	
 ﾠmaintenance	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠestablished	
 ﾠorder.	
 ﾠSee	
 ﾠK	
 ﾠ
Hewison,	
 ﾠ‘Of	
 ﾠRegimes,	
 ﾠState	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠPluralities:	
 ﾠThai	
 ﾠpolitics	
 ﾠenters	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ1990s’,	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠK	
 ﾠ
Hewison,	
 ﾠ R	
 ﾠ Robison	
 ﾠ &	
 ﾠ G	
 ﾠ Rodan	
 ﾠ (eds),	
 ﾠ Southeast	
 ﾠ Asia	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ 1990s:	
 ﾠ
Authoritarianism,	
 ﾠDemocracy	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠCapitalism,	
 ﾠSydney:	
 ﾠAllen	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠUnwin,	
 ﾠ1993,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ184.	
 ﾠ
20	
 ﾠA	
 ﾠBrown,	
 ﾠLabour,	
 ﾠPolitics	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠState	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠIndustrializing	
 ﾠThailand,	
 ﾠLondon:	
 ﾠ
RoutledgeCurzon,	
 ﾠ2004,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ134.	
 ﾠ
21	
 ﾠPasuk	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠBaker,	
 ﾠ‘Thaksin’s	
 ﾠpopulism’,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ71.	
 ﾠ
22	
 ﾠP a s u k 	
 ﾠP h o n g p a i c h i t 	
 ﾠ& 	
 ﾠC 	
 ﾠB a k e r , 	
 ﾠ‘ P l u t o -ﾭ‐populism	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ Thailand:	
 ﾠ business	
 ﾠ
remaking	
 ﾠ politics’,	
 ﾠ November	
 ﾠ 2003,	
 ﾠ pp	
 ﾠ 3-ﾭ‐4	
 ﾠ at	
 ﾠ
http://pioneer.netserv.chula.ac.th/~ppasuk/papers.htm,	
 ﾠ accessed	
 ﾠ 20	
 ﾠ February	
 ﾠ
2011.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
23	
 ﾠD	
 ﾠMcCargo,	
 ﾠ‘Network	
 ﾠmonarchy	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠlegitimacy	
 ﾠcrises	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠThailand’,	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠPacific	
 ﾠ
Review,	
 ﾠ18(4),	
 ﾠ2005,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ499-ﾭ‐519.	
 ﾠ
24	
 ﾠK	
 ﾠHewison,	
 ﾠ‘Constitutions,	
 ﾠregimes	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠpower	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠThailand’,	
 ﾠDemocratization,	
 ﾠ
14(5),	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ933.	
 ﾠ
25	
 ﾠK	
 ﾠJayasuriya	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠK	
 ﾠHewison,	
 ﾠ‘The	
 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐politics	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠgood	
 ﾠgovernance:	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠglobal	
 ﾠ
social	
 ﾠpolicy	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠglobal	
 ﾠpopulism?	
 ﾠCritical	
 ﾠAsian	
 ﾠStudies,	
 ﾠ36(4),	
 ﾠ2004,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ571-ﾭ‐91.	
 ﾠ
26	
 ﾠK	
 ﾠHewison,	
 ﾠ‘Crafting	
 ﾠThailand’s	
 ﾠnew	
 ﾠsocial	
 ﾠcontract’,	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠPacific	
 ﾠReview,	
 ﾠ17(4),	
 ﾠ
2004,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ503-ﾭ‐522.	
 ﾠ
27	
 ﾠJ	
 ﾠGlassman,	
 ﾠ‘“The	
 ﾠprovinces	
 ﾠelect	
 ﾠgovernments,	
 ﾠBangkok	
 ﾠoverthrows	
 ﾠthem”:	
 ﾠ
urbanity,	
 ﾠclass	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐democracy	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠThailand’,	
 ﾠUrban	
 ﾠStudies,	
 ﾠ47(6),	
 ﾠ2010,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ
1311-ﾭ‐1312.	
 ﾠ
28	
 ﾠP 	
 ﾠH a n d l e y , 	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠ King	
 ﾠ Never	
 ﾠ Smiles.	
 ﾠ A	
 ﾠ Biography	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ Thailand’s	
 ﾠ Bhumibol	
 ﾠ
Adulyadej,	
 ﾠ New	
 ﾠ Haven:	
 ﾠ Yale	
 ﾠ University	
 ﾠ Press,	
 ﾠ 2006,	
 ﾠ pp.419-ﾭ‐420;	
 ﾠ K	
 ﾠ Hewison,	
 ﾠ
‘Constitutions,	
 ﾠregimes	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠpower’,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ937-ﾭ‐938.	
 ﾠ26	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
29	
 ﾠPasuk	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠBaker,	
 ﾠ‘Thaksin’s	
 ﾠpopulism’,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ66.	
 ﾠ
30	
 ﾠT h i s 	
 ﾠi n c l u d e d 	
 ﾠp r i v a t i s a t i o n 	
 ﾠp o l i c i e s , 	
 ﾠw h i c h 	
 ﾠT h a k s i n 	
 ﾠi mplemented	
 ﾠ against	
 ﾠ
labour	
 ﾠleaders’	
 ﾠwishes.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
31	
 ﾠQuoted	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠPasuk	
 ﾠPhongpaichit	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠC	
 ﾠBaker,	
 ﾠThaksin:	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠBusiness	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠPolitics	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ
Thailand,	
 ﾠChiang	
 ﾠMai:	
 ﾠSilkworm	
 ﾠBooks,	
 ﾠ2004,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ170	
 ﾠ
32	
 ﾠQuoted	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠibid.,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ15.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
33	
 ﾠIbid.,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ41.	
 ﾠ
34	
 ﾠO 	
 ﾠP y e 	
 ﾠ& 	
 ﾠW 	
 ﾠS c h a f f a r , 	
 ﾠ‘ T h e 	
 ﾠ2 0 0 6 	
 ﾠa n t i -ﾭ‐Thaksin	
 ﾠ movement	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ Thailand:	
 ﾠ an	
 ﾠ
analysis’,	
 ﾠJournal	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠContemporary	
 ﾠAsia,	
 ﾠ38(1),	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ38-ﾭ‐61.	
 ﾠ
35	
 ﾠG 	
 ﾠJ 	
 ﾠU n g p a k o r n , 	
 ﾠA	
 ﾠ Coup	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ Rich:	
 ﾠ Thailand’s	
 ﾠ political	
 ﾠ crisis,	
 ﾠ Bangkok:	
 ﾠ
Workers	
 ﾠDemocracy	
 ﾠPublishing,	
 ﾠ2007.	
 ﾠ
36	
 ﾠK 	
 ﾠH e w i s o n , 	
 ﾠ‘ R e b e l l i o n , 	
 ﾠr e p r e s s i o n 	
 ﾠa n d 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠr e d 	
 ﾠs h i r t s ’ , 	
 ﾠEast	
 ﾠ Asia	
 ﾠ Forum	
 ﾠ
Quarterly,	
 ﾠ2(2),	
 ﾠ2010,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ14-ﾭ‐17.	
 ﾠ
37	
 ﾠJacques-ﾭ‐Chai	
 ﾠChomthongdi	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠChaninda	
 ﾠChanyapate,	
 ﾠ‘Aftermath	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠbattle:	
 ﾠ
picking	
 ﾠ up	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ pieces’,	
 ﾠ Focus	
 ﾠ on	
 ﾠ Global	
 ﾠ South,	
 ﾠ 25	
 ﾠ May	
 ﾠ 2010,	
 ﾠ available	
 ﾠ at	
 ﾠ
http://www.focusweb.org/content/aftermath-battle-picking-pieces,  accessed  26  May 
2010.	
 ﾠ
38	
 ﾠPasuk	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠBaker,	
 ﾠ‘Thaksin’s	
 ﾠpopulism’,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ78.	
 ﾠ
39	
 ﾠIbid.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
40	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠSee	
 ﾠK	
 ﾠHewison,	
 ﾠ‘Resisting	
 ﾠglobalization:	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠstudy	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠlocalism	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠThailand’,	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠ
Pacific	
 ﾠReview,	
 ﾠ13(2),	
 ﾠ2000,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ279-ﾭ‐296.	
 ﾠ
41	
 ﾠGlassman,	
 ﾠ‘The	
 ﾠprovinces	
 ﾠelect	
 ﾠgovernments’,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ1315.	
 ﾠ
42	
 ﾠQuoted	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠConnors,	
 ﾠDemocracy	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠNational	
 ﾠIdentity	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠThailand,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ223.	
 ﾠ
43	
 ﾠB	
 ﾠDressel,	
 ﾠ‘Thailand’s	
 ﾠelusive	
 ﾠquest	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠworkable	
 ﾠconstitution,	
 ﾠ1997-ﾭ‐2007’,	
 ﾠ
Contemporary	
 ﾠSoutheast	
 ﾠAsia,	
 ﾠ31(2),	
 ﾠ2009,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ303.	
 ﾠ
44	
 ﾠ This	
 ﾠ requirement	
 ﾠ has	
 ﾠ been	
 ﾠ relaxed	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ House	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ Representatives,	
 ﾠ but	
 ﾠ
clearly	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠSenate	
 ﾠnow	
 ﾠbecomes	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠmore	
 ﾠlikely	
 ﾠforce	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠblocking	
 ﾠinitiatives	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠan	
 ﾠ
elected	
 ﾠgovernment.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
45	
 ﾠInternational	
 ﾠCrisis	
 ﾠGroup,	
 ﾠ‘Thailand:	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠCalm	
 ﾠBefore	
 ﾠAnother	
 ﾠStorm?	
 ﾠAsia	
 ﾠ
Briefing,	
 ﾠ121,	
 ﾠ11	
 ﾠApril	
 ﾠ2011.	
 ﾠ
46	
 ﾠKengkij	
 ﾠKitirianglarp	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠK	
 ﾠHewison,	
 ﾠ‘Social	
 ﾠmovements	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠpolitical	
 ﾠopposition	
 ﾠ
in	
 ﾠcontemporary	
 ﾠThailand’,	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠPacific	
 ﾠReview,	
 ﾠ22(4),	
 ﾠ2009,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ471-ﾭ‐472.	
 ﾠ
47	
 ﾠR	
 ﾠDe	
 ﾠCastro,	
 ﾠ‘The	
 ﾠ1997	
 ﾠAsian	
 ﾠfinancial	
 ﾠcrisis	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠrevival	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠpopulism/neo-ﾭ‐
populism	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠ21st	
 ﾠcentury	
 ﾠPhilippines’,	
 ﾠAsian	
 ﾠSurvey,	
 ﾠ47(6),	
 ﾠ2007,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ941.	
 ﾠ
48	
 ﾠN	
 ﾠQuimpo,	
 ﾠContested	
 ﾠDemocracy	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠLeft	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠPhilippines	
 ﾠAfter	
 ﾠMarcos,	
 ﾠ
New	
 ﾠHaven,	
 ﾠConn.:	
 ﾠYale	
 ﾠUniversity	
 ﾠSoutheast	
 ﾠAsian	
 ﾠStudies,	
 ﾠ2008,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ143.	
 ﾠ
49	
 ﾠIbid.,	
 ﾠp.	
 ﾠ51;	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠCommittee	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠEvangelization	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠCulture	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠProvince	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
the	
 ﾠSociety	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠJesus,	
 ﾠEhem!	
 ﾠA	
 ﾠManual	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠDeepening	
 ﾠInvolvement	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠCombating	
 ﾠ
Corruption,	
 ﾠDavao	
 ﾠCity,	
 ﾠPhilippines:	
 ﾠAteneo	
 ﾠde	
 ﾠDavao	
 ﾠUniversity,	
 ﾠ2003.	
 ﾠ27	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
50	
 ﾠJ	
 ﾠHutchison,	
 ﾠ‘The	
 ﾠ“disallowed”	
 ﾠpolitical	
 ﾠparticipation	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠManila’s	
 ﾠurban	
 ﾠpoor’,	
 ﾠ
Democratization,	
 ﾠ14(5),	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ857.	
 ﾠ
51	
 ﾠJ 	
 ﾠH u t c h i s o n , 	
 ﾠ‘ P o v e r t y 	
 ﾠo f 	
 ﾠp o l i t i c s 	
 ﾠi n 	
 ﾠt h e 	
 ﾠP h i l i p p i n e s ’ , 	
 ﾠi n 	
 ﾠR o d a n , 	
 ﾠH e w i s o n 	
 ﾠ& 	
 ﾠ
Robison	
 ﾠ(eds),	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠPolitical	
 ﾠEconomy	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠSoutheast	
 ﾠAsia,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ63.	
 ﾠ
52	
 ﾠ M	
 ﾠ R	
 ﾠ Thompson,	
 ﾠ ‘After	
 ﾠ populism:	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ presidential	
 ﾠ election	
 ﾠ campaign	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
Philippines’,	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ Y	
 ﾠ Kasuya	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ N	
 ﾠ Quimpo,	
 ﾠ (eds),	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠ Politics	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ Change	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ
Philippines,	
 ﾠManila:	
 ﾠAnvil	
 ﾠPress,	
 ﾠ2010,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ212.	
 ﾠSee	
 ﾠalso	
 ﾠM	
 ﾠR	
 ﾠThompson,	
 ﾠ‘Reformism	
 ﾠ
vs.	
 ﾠpopulism	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠPhilippines’,	
 ﾠJournal	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠDemocracy,	
 ﾠ21(4),	
 ﾠ2010,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ21-ﾭ‐22.	
 ﾠ
53	
 ﾠC	
 ﾠTremewan,	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠPolitical	
 ﾠEconomy	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠSocial	
 ﾠControl	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠSingapore,	
 ﾠLondon:	
 ﾠ
Macmillan,	
 ﾠ1994;	
 ﾠChua	
 ﾠBeng-ﾭ‐Huat,	
 ﾠPolitical	
 ﾠLegitimacy	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠHousing:	
 ﾠStakeholding	
 ﾠ
in	
 ﾠSingapore,	
 ﾠLondon:	
 ﾠRoutledge,	
 ﾠ1997.	
 ﾠ
54	
 ﾠGoh	
 ﾠChok	
 ﾠTong,	
 ﾠ‘A	
 ﾠNation	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠExcellence’,	
 ﾠAddress	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠAlumni	
 ﾠInternational	
 ﾠ
Singapore,	
 ﾠ 1	
 ﾠ December	
 ﾠ 1986,	
 ﾠ Singapore,	
 ﾠ Ministry	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ Communications	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ
Information,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ7.	
 ﾠGoh	
 ﾠappears	
 ﾠhere	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠbe	
 ﾠinferring	
 ﾠethnic	
 ﾠplurality	
 ﾠrather	
 ﾠthan	
 ﾠ
political	
 ﾠplurality.	
 ﾠ
55	
 ﾠLee	
 ﾠHsien	
 ﾠLoong,	
 ﾠ‘Speech	
 ﾠby	
 ﾠDeputy	
 ﾠPrime	
 ﾠMinister	
 ﾠLee	
 ﾠHsien	
 ﾠLoong	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
Administrative	
 ﾠ Services	
 ﾠ Dinner	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ Promotion	
 ﾠ Ceremony’,	
 ﾠ 29	
 ﾠ March	
 ﾠ 1999,	
 ﾠ
Manadrin	
 ﾠ Hotel,	
 ﾠ Singapore,	
 ﾠ at	
 ﾠ
http://www.singapore21.org.sg/speeches_290399.html,	
 ﾠ accessed	
 ﾠ 4	
 ﾠ October	
 ﾠ
2006.	
 ﾠ
56	
 ﾠF e e d b a c k 	
 ﾠU n i t , 	
 ﾠBuilding	
 ﾠ Bridges:	
 ﾠ The	
 ﾠ Story	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ Feedback	
 ﾠ Unit,	
 ﾠ Singapore:	
 ﾠ
Feedback	
 ﾠUnit,	
 ﾠMinistry	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠCommunity	
 ﾠDevelopment	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠSports,	
 ﾠ2004,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ35-ﾭ‐37.	
 ﾠ
57	
 ﾠIbid.,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ10.	
 ﾠ
58	
 ﾠ See	
 ﾠ G	
 ﾠ Rodan	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ K	
 ﾠ Jayasuriya,	
 ﾠ ‘The	
 ﾠ technocratic	
 ﾠ politics	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ administrative	
 ﾠ
participation:	
 ﾠcase	
 ﾠstudies	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠSingapore	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠVietnam’,	
 ﾠDemocratization,	
 ﾠ14(3),	
 ﾠ
2007,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ802-ﾭ‐05.	
 ﾠ
59	
 ﾠQuoted	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠHo	
 ﾠKhai	
 ﾠLeong,	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠPolitics	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠPolicy-ﾭMaking	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠSingapore,	
 ﾠOxford:	
 ﾠ
Oxford	
 ﾠUniversity	
 ﾠPress,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ90.	
 ﾠ
60	
 ﾠSee	
 ﾠKhoo	
 ﾠBoo	
 ﾠTeik,	
 ﾠEthnic	
 ﾠStructure,	
 ﾠInequality	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠGovernance	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠPublic	
 ﾠ
Sector:	
 ﾠ Malaysian	
 ﾠ Experiences,	
 ﾠ Democracy,	
 ﾠ Governance	
 ﾠ &	
 ﾠ Human	
 ﾠ Rights	
 ﾠ
Programme	
 ﾠ Paper,	
 ﾠ No.	
 ﾠ 20,	
 ﾠ United	
 ﾠ Nations	
 ﾠ Research	
 ﾠ Institute	
 ﾠ for	
 ﾠ Social	
 ﾠ
Development,	
 ﾠDecember	
 ﾠ2005.	
 ﾠ
61	
 ﾠD	
 ﾠBrown,	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠState	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠEthnic	
 ﾠPolitics	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠSoutheast	
 ﾠAsia,	
 ﾠLondon:	
 ﾠRoutledge,	
 ﾠ
1994,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ222.	
 ﾠ
62	
 ﾠK	
 ﾠS	
 ﾠJomo	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠP	
 ﾠTodd,	
 ﾠTrade	
 ﾠUnions	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠState	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠPeninsula	
 ﾠMalaysia,	
 ﾠOxford:	
 ﾠ
Oxford	
 ﾠUniversity	
 ﾠPress,	
 ﾠ1994,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ88-ﾭ‐103.	
 ﾠ
63	
 ﾠH	
 ﾠCrouch,	
 ﾠ‘Malaysia:	
 ﾠneither	
 ﾠauthoritarian	
 ﾠnor	
 ﾠdemocratic’	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠK	
 ﾠHewison,	
 ﾠR	
 ﾠ
Robison	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠG	
 ﾠRodan	
 ﾠ(eds),	
 ﾠSoutheast	
 ﾠAsia	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ1990s,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ148;	
 ﾠJ	
 ﾠKathaiah,	
 ﾠ‘No	
 ﾠ
Government	
 ﾠ will	
 ﾠ Bother	
 ﾠ About	
 ﾠ MTUC’,	
 ﾠ Malaysiakini,	
 ﾠ 29	
 ﾠ December	
 ﾠ 2010	
 ﾠ
http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/151890,	
 ﾠaccessed	
 ﾠ30	
 ﾠDecember	
 ﾠ2010.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ28	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
64	
 ﾠThis	
 ﾠwas	
 ﾠnot	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠfirst	
 ﾠtime	
 ﾠsuch	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠcoalition	
 ﾠformed.	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠAnwar-ﾭ‐led	
 ﾠMalaysia	
 ﾠ
Islamic	
 ﾠYouth	
 ﾠMovement	
 ﾠ(ABIM)	
 ﾠAnti-ﾭ‐Societies	
 ﾠAct	
 ﾠmovement	
 ﾠduring	
 ﾠ1981-ﾭ‐1982	
 ﾠ
included	
 ﾠNGOs.	
 ﾠ
65	
 ﾠ F	
 ﾠ Loh,	
 ﾠ ‘Procedural	
 ﾠ democracy,	
 ﾠ participatory	
 ﾠ democracy	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ regional	
 ﾠ
networking:	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐terrain	
 ﾠstruggle	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠdemocracy	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠSoutheast	
 ﾠAsia’,	
 ﾠInter-ﾭ
Cultural	
 ﾠStudies,	
 ﾠ9(1),	
 ﾠ2008,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ131-ﾭ‐132.	
 ﾠ
66	
 ﾠM	
 ﾠL	
 ﾠWeiss,	
 ﾠProtest	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠPossibilities:	
 ﾠCivil	
 ﾠSociety	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠCoalitions	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠPolitical	
 ﾠ
Change	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠMalaysia,	
 ﾠStanford:	
 ﾠStanford	
 ﾠUniversity	
 ﾠPress,	
 ﾠ2006,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ127-ﾭ‐61.	
 ﾠ
67	
 ﾠM	
 ﾠL	
 ﾠWeiss,	
 ﾠ‘Edging	
 ﾠtowards	
 ﾠa	
 ﾠnew	
 ﾠpolitics	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠMalaysia:	
 ﾠcivil	
 ﾠsociety	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ
gate?’,	
 ﾠAsian	
 ﾠSurvey,	
 ﾠ49(4),	
 ﾠ2009,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ754-ﾭ‐756.	
 ﾠ
68	
 ﾠW	
 ﾠCase,	
 ﾠ‘Transition	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠsingle-ﾭ‐party	
 ﾠdominance?	
 ﾠNew	
 ﾠdata	
 ﾠfrom	
 ﾠMalaysia’,	
 ﾠ
Journal	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠEast	
 ﾠAsian	
 ﾠStudies,	
 ﾠ10(1),	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ106-ﾭ‐109.	
 ﾠ
69	
 ﾠ Maznah	
 ﾠ Mohamad,	
 ﾠ ‘Malaysia	
 ﾠ –	
 ﾠ democracy	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ end	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ ethnic	
 ﾠ politics?’,	
 ﾠ
Australian	
 ﾠJournal	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠInternational	
 ﾠAffairs,	
 ﾠ62(4),	
 ﾠ2008,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ444.	
 ﾠ
70	
 ﾠIbid.,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ452.	
 ﾠ
71	
 ﾠIbid.,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ455.	
 ﾠ
72	
 ﾠIbid.,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ447.	
 ﾠ
73	
 ﾠIbid.,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ443.	
 ﾠ
74	
 ﾠKhoo,	
 ﾠEthnic	
 ﾠStructure,	
 ﾠInequality	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠGovernance,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ33,	
 ﾠ38.	
 ﾠ
75	
 ﾠ‘Chinese	
 ﾠmust	
 ﾠchoose	
 ﾠ–	
 ﾠvote	
 ﾠMCA	
 ﾠor	
 ﾠelse	
 ﾠno	
 ﾠgov’t	
 ﾠposts’,	
 ﾠmalaysiakini,	
 ﾠ30	
 ﾠApril	
 ﾠ
2011,	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠhttp://www.malaysiakini.com/news/162902,	
 ﾠaccessed	
 ﾠ5	
 ﾠMay	
 ﾠ2011.	
 ﾠ
76	
 ﾠ Quoted	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ Asrul	
 ﾠ Hadi	
 ﾠ Abdullah	
 ﾠ Sani,	
 ﾠ ‘Umno	
 ﾠ is	
 ﾠ scared	
 ﾠ of	
 ﾠ us,	
 ﾠ says	
 ﾠ Anwar’,	
 ﾠ
Malaysian	
 ﾠ Insider,	
 ﾠ 29	
 ﾠ November	
 ﾠ 2010,	
 ﾠ at	
 ﾠ
http://lite.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/umno-ﾭ‐is-ﾭ‐scared-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐us-ﾭ‐
says-ﾭ‐anwar,	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠaccessed	
 ﾠ3	
 ﾠDecember	
 ﾠ2010.	
 ﾠ
77	
 ﾠMaznah,	
 ﾠ‘Malaysia	
 ﾠ–	
 ﾠdemocracy	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠend	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠethnic	
 ﾠpolitics?’,	
 ﾠp	
 ﾠ455.	
 ﾠ
78	
 ﾠT	
 ﾠYeoh,	
 ﾠ‘The	
 ﾠPakatan	
 ﾠRakyat	
 ﾠSelangor	
 ﾠstate	
 ﾠadministration:	
 ﾠpresent	
 ﾠand	
 ﾠfuture	
 ﾠ
challenges	
 ﾠon	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠroad	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠreform’,	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠRound	
 ﾠTable,	
 ﾠ99(407),	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ187-ﾭ‐8.	
 ﾠ
79	
 ﾠKuek	
 ﾠSer	
 ﾠKuang	
 ﾠKeng,	
 ﾠ‘PKR	
 ﾠneeds	
 ﾠChinese-ﾭ‐majority	
 ﾠseats	
 ﾠtoo’,	
 ﾠmalaysiakini,	
 ﾠ29	
 ﾠ
March	
 ﾠ2011,	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠhttp://www.malaysiakini.com/news/159941,	
 ﾠaccessed	
 ﾠ8	
 ﾠApril.	
 ﾠ
80	
 ﾠAidilqa	
 ﾠRazak,	
 ﾠ‘HRP	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠPakatan:	
 ﾠGive	
 ﾠus	
 ﾠ15	
 ﾠparliamentary	
 ﾠseats’,	
 ﾠmalaysiakini,	
 ﾠ
19	
 ﾠ December	
 ﾠ 2010,	
 ﾠ at	
 ﾠ http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/151207,	
 ﾠ accessed	
 ﾠ
21	
 ﾠDecember	
 ﾠ2010.	
 ﾠ
81	
 ﾠSee,	
 ﾠfor	
 ﾠexample,	
 ﾠJeyakumar	
 ﾠDevaraj,	
 ﾠ‘Why	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠHindraf	
 ﾠapproach	
 ﾠis	
 ﾠmisguided’,	
 ﾠ
Aliran,	
 ﾠJanuary	
 ﾠ2008,	
 ﾠat	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠhttp://aliran.com/394.html,	
 ﾠaccessed	
 ﾠ11	
 ﾠAugust	
 ﾠ2010.	
 ﾠ
82	
 ﾠ See	
 ﾠ Wong	
 ﾠ Choon	
 ﾠ Mei,	
 ﾠ ‘Arab	
 ﾠ Spring	
 ﾠ or	
 ﾠ T-ﾭ‐shirt	
 ﾠ revolution,	
 ﾠ it	
 ﾠ has	
 ﾠ arrived	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ
Malaysia’,	
 ﾠ Malaysia	
 ﾠ Chronicle,	
 ﾠ 30	
 ﾠ June	
 ﾠ 2011,	
 ﾠ at	
 ﾠ http://www.malaysia-ﾭ‐
chronicle.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=14942:arab-ﾭ‐spring-ﾭ‐
or-ﾭ‐t-ﾭ‐shir-ﾭ‐revolution-ﾭ‐it-ﾭ‐has-ﾭ‐arrived-ﾭ‐in-ﾭ‐malaysia&Itemid=2,	
 ﾠ accessed	
 ﾠ 30	
 ﾠ June	
 ﾠ
2011.	
 ﾠ29	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
83	
 ﾠThe	
 ﾠEconomist,	
 ﾠ‘Taken	
 ﾠto	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠcleaners:	
 ﾠpolitical	
 ﾠaffray	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠMalaysia’,	
 ﾠ14	
 ﾠJuly	
 ﾠ
2011,	
 ﾠp.	
 ﾠ46.	
 ﾠ
84	
 ﾠJayasuriya	
 ﾠ&	
 ﾠRodan,	
 ﾠ‘Beyond	
 ﾠhybrid	
 ﾠregimes’,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ783-ﾭ‐5.	
 ﾠ
85	
 ﾠSee	
 ﾠV	
 ﾠHadiz,	
 ﾠLocalising	
 ﾠPower	
 ﾠin	
 ﾠPost-ﾭAuthoritarian	
 ﾠIndonesia:	
 ﾠA	
 ﾠSoutheast	
 ﾠAsia	
 ﾠ
Perspective,	
 ﾠStanford:	
 ﾠStanford	
 ﾠuniversity	
 ﾠPress,	
 ﾠ2010.	
 ﾠ
86	
 ﾠSee	
 ﾠJ	
 ﾠAceron,	
 ﾠ‘It’s	
 ﾠthe	
 ﾠ(non-ﾭ‐)	
 ﾠsystem,	
 ﾠstupid!	
 ﾠExplaining	
 ﾠ“mal-ﾭ‐development”	
 ﾠof	
 ﾠ
parties	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ Philippines’,	
 ﾠ in	
 ﾠ Reforming	
 ﾠ the	
 ﾠ Philippine	
 ﾠ Political	
 ﾠ Party	
 ﾠ System:	
 ﾠ
ideas	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ initiatives,	
 ﾠ debates	
 ﾠ and	
 ﾠ dynamics,	
 ﾠ Manila:	
 ﾠ Friedrich	
 ﾠ Ebert	
 ﾠ Stiftung,	
 ﾠ
2009,	
 ﾠpp	
 ﾠ1-ﾭ‐22.	
 ﾠ	
 ﾠ
	
 ﾠ